Willie Davis v. S. Brown by unknown
2014 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-24-2014 
Willie Davis v. S. Brown 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014 
Recommended Citation 
"Willie Davis v. S. Brown" (2014). 2014 Decisions. 224. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014/224 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2014 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 13-2575 
____________ 
 
WILLIE L. DAVIS, 
       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
S. BROWN; WARDEN B.A. BLEDSOE 
 __________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 3-12-cv-01294) 
District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 24, 2014 
 
Before: SMITH, GARTH and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: February 25, 2014) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellant Willie Davis appeals from an order of the District Court granting 
summary judgment to the defendants.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
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 Davis, who is housed in the Special Management Unit (“SMU”) at the United 
States Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, suffers from asthma.  On January 12, 
2012, pepper spray (Oleoresin Capsicum) was used to subdue another inmate in the 
SMU.  Davis was affected and he suffered a severe asthma attack.  He was taken to the 
prison Health Services and treated successfully.  Following this episode, Davis submitted 
an informal request to staff  asking that a sign be placed on his cell door instructing staff 
to remove him from the area before pepper spray is used in the SMU.  According to 
Davis, Health Services Administrator S. Brown ignored his request.   
Dissatisfied with Brown’s lack of a response, in February, 2012, Davis submitted 
a grievance to Warden Bledsoe.  Warden Bledsoe denied his request that a sign be placed 
on his cell door which instructed staff to remove him from the area prior to using pepper 
spray in the SMU, noting that Davis had been treated by the health services staff 
following the January, 2012 incident, and advising Davis to take any future medical 
concerns to the medical personnel who were treating him.  Several months later, on June 
8, 2012, Davis suffered another asthma attack when pepper spray was used in the SMU.  
He was taken to Health Services and treated. 
 Davis filed a Bivens
1
 action in the United States District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania against Administrator Brown and Warden Bledsoe, alleging that 
they violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment because they refused his request 
that in the future he be removed from his cell prior to the use of pepper spray in the SMU.  
                                              
1
 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971). 
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Brown and Warden Bledsoe moved to dismiss Davis’ amended complaint, or, in the 
alternative, for summary judgment.  The defendants noted that Warden Bledsoe had 
retired prior to the second incident, and that neither Warden Bledsoe nor Administrator 
Brown directly provided health care to inmates, and, accordingly, neither could be held 
personally liable to Davis for money damages in a civil rights actions.  In the alternative, 
Davis failed to show that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to a serious 
medical need.  The defendants further argued in the alternative that they were qualifiedly 
immunized from a suit for damages.  The defendants successfully moved to stay 
discovery pending the outcome of their motion.   
Davis submitted opposition to the defendants’ motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 
56, in which he claimed that he needed to conduct discovery in order to effectively 
oppose the defendants’ motion.  The discovery sought included information about the use 
of pepper spray in the SMU and information about inmates who had suffered injury as a 
result of the use of pepper spray.  Davis argued that the defendants had the required 
culpable state of mind because inmates in the SMU were getting pepper-sprayed every 
other day, and he argued that Warden Bledsoe and Administrator Brown were indeed the 
proper defendants in this civil action. 
The Magistrate Judge recommended that summary judgment be awarded to the 
defendants.  Noting first that Davis was not challenging the adequacy of the medical care 
he received for his two asthma attacks, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Davis failed 
to show that the defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his safety.  
Citing Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993), the Magistrate Judge 
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reasoned that deliberate indifference is not shown where supervisory correctional staff do 
not respond to the medical complaints of a prisoner who is already being treated by 
prison medical staff.  In short, because defendants were entitled to defer to the judgment 
of prison medical staff on questions of medical necessity, Davis did not state a 
constitutional tort.  In the alternative, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the defendants 
were qualifiedly immunized from a suit for money damages.  Davis submitted objections 
to the Report and Recommendation, complaining that he had been denied the right to 
conduct discovery.   
In an order entered on May 20, 2013, the District Court overruled the objections, 
adopted the Report and Recommendation, and granted summary judgment to the 
defendants.  The court further concluded that discovery was unnecessary. 
 Davis appeals.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.  Alcoa, Inc. v. United States, 509 
F.3d 173, 175 (3d Cir. 2007).  Davis contends in his Informal Brief that summary 
judgment for the defendants was not proper because they had actual knowledge of his 
asthma and actual knowledge that pepper spray was used in the SMU under 
circumstances that might cause him to suffer an asthma attack.  He also contends that he 
was denied the discovery he needed in order to defeat the defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment, and that summary judgment was not proper because he did not 
receive adequate notice that summary judgment would be considered.
2
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 Davis also requests that we indict and investigate the District Court and Magistrate 
Judge for “committing treason against their allegiance and oath,” Appellant’s Informal 
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 Summary judgment is proper where the moving party shows “that there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the 
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.  See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 n.10 (1986).  If the moving party has carried its 
burden, the nonmovant must then come forward with evidence showing that there is a 
triable issue.  See id. at 587.  A triable, or genuine, issue of material fact is one that could 
change the outcome of the litigation.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 
(1986).   
 We will affirm.  As a threshold matter, Davis plainly was on notice that the 
District Court would consider summary judgment because the defendants moved in the 
alternative for summary judgment.  In addition, he invoked Rule 56 to the extent that it 
provides that, when facts are unavailable to the nonmovant, and “[i]f a nonmovant shows 
by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to 
justify its opposition, the court may: . . . (2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations 
or to take discovery; in opposing summary judgment.”  Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(d)(2).  
Accordingly, the notice required in Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 341-42 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(1989) (court must give notice that it intends to convert a motion to dismiss into a motion 
for summary judgment and permit nonmoving party to submit materials opposing 
                                                                                                                                                  
Brief, at 4, citing among other federal statutes 28 U.S.C. § 455.  Davis’ allegations are 
baseless; we see nothing in the record that would give us a reason to question the District 
Court’s or Magistrate Judge’s impartiality, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). 
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summary judgment prior to doing so), was not required here.  We also agree with the 
District Court that discovery would not have changed the summary judgment result here.   
 With respect to Davis’ primary contention, correctional officials who are 
deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of an inmate violate the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 
U.S. 97, 103 (1976).  But to establish deliberate indifference, a prison official must both 
know of and disregard an excessive risk to the inmate’s health or safety.  Farmer v. 
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).  To state a constitutional claim, the official must both 
be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of 
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.  See id.   
The facts are undisputed here.  Davis’ Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate 
indifference rested on an allegation that Warden Bledsoe and Administrator Brown failed 
to protect him from the June, 2012 asthma attack by failing to take any protective action 
after being notified of the January, 2012 asthma attack. Summary judgment for the 
defendants was proper here because the summary judgment record establishes that the 
defendants did not act with a sufficiently culpable state of mind, that is, with deliberate 
indifference to Davis’ serious medical needs.  We said in Durmer that correctional 
defendant-administrators who were not themselves physicians cannot “be considered 
deliberately indifferent simply because they failed to respond directly to the medical 
complaints of a prisoner who was already being treated by the prison doctor.”  991 F.2d 
at 69.  See also Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.2d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004) (“If a prisoner is under 
the care of medical experts . . ., a non-medical prison official will generally be justified in 
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believing that the prisoner is in capable hands.”).  In Spruill, we held that “absent a 
reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are 
mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison official . . . will not be 
chargeable with the Eighth Amendment scienter requirement of deliberate indifference.”  
Id.  
Spruill applies here because Davis did not show that the defendants’ involvement 
in the matter consisted of anything more than reviewing his grievance and deferring to 
the judgment of medical personnel.  Davis did not allege or establish that either 
Administrator Brown or Warden Bledsoe had actual knowledge that prison heath staff 
were mistreating his condition by failing to address his repeated exposure to pepper 
spray.  In addition, Davis did not show through competent medical evidence that his 
asthma condition was so serious that he could never be near the use of pepper spray, or 
that he risked serious damage to his future health.  We note that Davis filed a “petition of 
writ of mandamus” in the District Court, in which he sought injunctive relief, explaining 
that he had suffered a third asthma attack on July 30, 2012.  Although the Magistrate 
Judge issued an order deeming this mandamus petition withdrawn under the local rules 
(because Davis failed to submit a supporting brief), Davis attached his medical records to 
it.  They are plainly pertinent to the summary judgment issue and show that, after Davis’ 
second asthma attack was treated, he was sent to the recreation yard until the spray in the 
SMU dispersed.  Medical staff did not recommend any modifications to his assignment in 
the SMU.  Following treatment for this third attack, Davis was released back to his 
housing unit with no restrictions. 
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Accordingly, summary judgment for Warden Bledsoe and Administrator Brown 
was proper here.  We emphasize the limited nature of our holding.  Davis chose to file the 
instant Bivens action against two officials who were not treating him for his asthma and 
who were not medically responsible for determining whether his asthma is so serious that 
he could never be near the use of pepper spray.  He exhausted his administrative remedies 
only with respect to the first asthma attack and the defendants’ response to it, see 42 
U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to bringing 
suit), and those defendants cannot be considered deliberately indifferent to his serious 
medical needs in violation of the Eight Amendment for their limited actions.  Moreover, 
the sum total of the allegations in his complaint do not support any actionable claims that 
have merit. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court granting 
summary judgment to the defendants.
